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Reading Our Rights 
One of the features that has characterized political struggle over the past two decades 
has been the resurgence of a discourse on rights. As a wide variety of recent scholarship 
attests, this resurgence has forced upon the Marxist critique of the merely privative 
nature of rights discourse (as well as upon the "postmodern" variants of that critique) a 
reconsideration of its terms. Specifically, it has forced upon that critique a recognition of 
the irreducibility of political claims (and the forms of incorporation and enfranchisement 
to which those claims give rise) to any economic or "material" determination. It might 
therefore be tempting to see in the "return to rights" a vindication of the principles of a 
liberal polity, that is, of a polity which seeks to maintain a more or less rigorous distinc- 
tion between the rules according to which its citizens gain political franchise and those 
according to which they gain material well-being. In this view, the recent proliferation of 
rights claims would need to be seen within the more general context of the ascendancy 
of a "democratic"/capitalist world order, an ascendancy which would then be taken to 
arise not merely as a result of historical contingencies but as the realization of universal 
principles of justice. As examples of this interpretation, we need only consult the self- 
congratulatory readings the Western media has offered of recent events in East Germany, 
the Soviet Union, and communist China. 
A few observations will serve to give the lie to this account. To begin, we may note 
that part of what is specific to those claims which have emerged so startlingly in contem- 
porary political discourse is their contestation of any version of right which would suggest 
that the material conditions of the claimant's existence have a merely contingent bearing 
on the fact and quality of their political franchise. Of course, were this the extent of the 
novelty forwarded by these claims, they could hardly be thought to pose any grave threat 
to the principles of liberal polity. Notwithstanding liberal theory's recourse to a distinc- 
tion between civil and political societies which is at once cynical and selective, the modern 
liberal state has found it impossible to manage those crises occurring at its margins without 
some version - however implicit or disavowed - of a social right. For what characterizes 
the modern state in its neo-liberal no less than in its Communist forms is its transforma- 
tion of a question regarding the adjudication of right into one of the administration of 
life. In the face of this transformation, however occulted or incomplete, any attempt 
to rigorously distinguish between right and need, political franchise and material well- 
being, must prove as illusory as their revolutionary identification. 
Having acknowledged the above, what proves crucial, and crucially original, in the 
claims under question is that while they can no longer find their source and guarantee 
in the sovereign political institution of the State (they lie outside the purview of the polit- 
ical narrowly defined), they nevertheless continue, and of necessity, to place upon that 
State a demand for recognition. Indeed, the capacity to respond to these claims as they 
arise at the State's periphery has become the condition of the State's legitimacy. This 
peculiarly modern coimplication of civil and political societies (thanks to which the 
self-legislating autonomy of the state can only be forwarded at the expense of a recogni- 
tion of the constitutive alterity of the social) has been brilliantly described by Claude 
Lefort. What for Lefort characterizes modern democracy is the peculiar role it  assigns to 
the social body: that of providing the locus for the process of consensus building from 
which both political and legislative imperatives will arise. But there is, I would suggest, 
an aporia over which Lefort's analysis glosses. For if, as Lefort seems to suggest, the 
formal mechanisms on whose basis the State asserts its self-legislating autonomy must 
have recourse to a social body which would fill out the lacuna left by the disappearance 
of substantial social ties, the supplement offered by that body cannot fail to return that 
substance in the very form the state had thought to expunge; that is, the social body can 
only lend its authority to the political institution in forms that are less self-legislating 
than customary, rooted in traditions that are stubbornly recalcitrant in the face of every 
attempt to recuperate their origins. 
The above statement can be granted, however, only on condition that we supplement 
it with an acknowledgement of the extent to which modernity's reconfiguration of the 
social had the effect of mitigating - without ever entirely evacuating - the customary 
dimension of our relations with others. As Marx emphasizes in "On the Jewish Question," 
the separation of state and civil society had the effect of robbing society of both its tradi- 
tional and its public character, reducing it to a "mass" of competing drives and interests 
stripped of any customarily acquired normative horizon. In order to close the crisis of 
authority opened by this withdrawal of political substance from the civil sphere, it was 
necessary that the state then reintroduce itself in the form of a legalladministrative appa- 
ratus. (Hence Hegel's recognition that the police and the corporation mark the limiting 
conditions on that freedom which characterizes the civil sphere.) The state of right (whose 
customary horizon is putatively that of the "nation") is already, at its very inception, the 
right of state. The question of the people's sovereign articulation is always also that of a 
population's technical administration. 
Where, then, does this leave us with respect to what I am claiming to be the custom- 
ary horizon of recent rights claims? That is, given the fact that these claims aim at some 
form of juridicallpolitical enfranchisement, given, morever, that they do so even as their 
substance remains hetetogenous to the modern state's formal mechanisms for ratifying 
competing versions of the Good Life, how are they to be legally instituted in such a way 
as to retain the challenge they present not to any particular article of the law but rather to 
the formal horizon of modern law in general and as such? Here it is a question not merely 
of getting the law to enforce these claims, but of forcing these claims upon the law, of 
forcing the law to recognize them as the limit placed on the State's capacity to rationally 
recuperate its own origins. This is clearly the case wth respect to claims currently being 
made by Canada's native peoples, as well as with respect to those being made under the 
rubric of a politics of ethnicity. But I would suggest that it is equally, if less obviously, the 
case in the articulation of the political interests of gays and women as well: for here, too, 
it is a question of recovering histories which are not the histories of the nation and its 
legally protected subject, but of collectivities operating unofficially at the margins of the 
state and its legal apparatus. In the extent to which the subjects of such histories are nei- 
ther the individual as sovereign moral agent nor the nation as sovereign political agent, 
their articulation of historically contingent forms of collectivity could be said to return 
to the civil sphere something of that public dimension which had once surrounded it. 
The "contractual" reduction of forms of public responsibility to a negotiation between 
atomized liberties is well-known - not least from its Hegelian critique. However, despite 
the fact that Hegel rejects not merely the contractual ideal of social life in general, 
but, specifically, the contractual understanding of marriage as the mutual holding of 
property in persons, it remains the case that, as Carole Pateman suggests, his definition 
of marriage as the mutual recognition of lovers retains within itself, however covertly, a 
contractual paradigm, a paradigm which then provides the basis for a passage from 
private to public sphere. Here Pateman quite rightly points to an equivocation on Hegel's 
part regarding the question of whether that ethical community represented by the 
family is to be associated with the sphere of natural necessity or with a freedom which 
requires the subject's alienation of itself through the mediation of forms of property. This 
equivocation is clear in the ambivalence which surrounds the corporational status (or non- 
status) of the family: on one hand, that "love" which is the ethical substance of the family 
is prior to the privatized relations that characterize corporations within civil society; on 
the other hand, in the extent to which marital arrangements implying not merely ethical 
but juridical sanction emerge as a necessary feature of family life, the family involves 
something like a contractual binding together of juridically protected and privatized indi- 
viduals. I t  is Pateman's project to show not only the extent to which a contractual privati- 
zation of forms of public responsibility is endemic to modern political life (remaining 
even at the core of Hegel's critique of the contract ), but also to show how this privatiza- 
tion obscures the question of what sort of collective responsibility might fall to us in the 
face of social bonds which prove resistant to contractual rationalization.' In the extent to 
which such a project would assume the possibility of responsibility to these bonds, it 
assumes that their being in excess of the contract demands something other than quasi- 
stoic resignation in the face of biological necessity; i t  assumes, in other words, the histori- 
cal, humanly inflected character of our needs and the relationships to which they give 
rise. Conversely, in the extent to which this historical dimension of human being involves 
something other than the progressive mastery of necessity by a sovereign agent (cognitive, 
practical, and moral) - that is, in the extent to which such an agent will always require, 
as the enabling condition of its freedom, not any particular historical condition but 
history as conditionality in general - the movement from nature to history, from neces- 
sity to right, cannot be thought on the basis of that agent's self-legislating capacity for 
recuperating the pathogenesis of its origins. In sum, Pateman's project involves vindicat- 
ing the presence of collectivities that find the basis for their legitimacy neither in the 
sovereignty of the nation state, nor in the contractual binding of privatized individuali- 
ties, but in the carnal implication of our destinies as we occupy, however contingently, a 
common space and time. 
By carnality, we must understand not simply the corporeal conditions of identity (our 
skin as limit) but also the very limen in and on which that identity is complicated (that 
same skin as threshold). This means that the appeal to the body must involve something 
other than the recovery of an identity or substance (being woman, being black, etc.) which 
the law's formal abstractions would have excluded; it must involve a recognition that the 
body has no given substance prior to the inscription of the socius on it. Now, in the 
extent to which that inscription is identified as "customary," it is seen as arising more or 
less organically from the needs of the body itself (rather than as being imposed by a force 
which acts over against those proper to the body). As Peter Goodrich suggests in "The 
Jurispridence of Difference," according to the customary paradigm of law: "Nature herself 
was deemed the ultimate origin of rules that were older than the oldest human law." 
The status of this immemorial body would of course become problematic for a modern 
legal state that understood its legitimacy to rest not so much in the "substance" of tradi- 
tion (itself grounded in natural law) as in formal mechanisms designed to guarantee free 
self-legislation in a present undetermined by the superstitions of the past. As we have seen, 
that past represents a content which must be at once excluded - as extrinsic to the formal 
mechanisms upon which legal equality depends - and reintroduced - if, indeed, those 
mechanisms are going to have anything to work on. As Dilip Yogasundrum indicates in 
"Writing Cultural Differences into the Law,'' a paradoxical temporality can be seen to 
ensue from the peculiar form of this reintroduction: the extraneity of customary claims to 
the formal principles of the modern legal state can only be recognized retroactively as 
the prehistory of that state. This logic of future anteriority effectively guarantees the 
mythic or figural reification of custom even as it ensures its functional exclusion (a point 
made by Peter Goodrich with respect to the legal mystification of female subjects). 
The task given to those discourses which would return to the law's serial reduction of cul- 
tural difference something of that communality which provided its original context of 
emergence suffers under a similar temporal paradox. In the extent to which these dis- 
courses are themselves forced to read the suffering body through its legal inscription, that 
task must involve something other than a simple recovery of customary (read: natural) 
forms of sociality. For the logic of such recovery is the logic of legal abstraction itself: it 
assumes that the immemoriality of custom can be reduced to a past that would be merely 
a modality of the present. Against this logic we may oppose one which would read 
immemoriality in terms of a post-Heideggerian "always already," that "past" whose patho- 
genesis is immanent and irreducible in the symbolic founding act. I t  is this temporizing 
erance: logic that Derrida identifies under the term diff 
It is because of difflrance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 
"present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something 
other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already let- 
ting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related 
as much to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is 
called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not; what it absolutely is not, not 
even as past or as future as a modified p re~en t .~  
Any strategy that would attempt to contest the legal reduction of cultural difference 
to that seriality of social facts Yogasundrum describes would therefore need to proceed 
along a double axis: at once continuing to make its claims on the basis of justice's possibility 
and recognizing as the condition of that possibility, its impossibility, that is, the impossi- 
bility of justice realizing itself in the present. In the extent t o  which there will have been justice, 
it will not have been in the form of apresent. It is this articulation - which provides, despite 
its melancholy ring, the very basis of any hope for justice - that Deborah Esch would 
seem to hear in Alice James's determination to respect the rights of death, not simply the 
right t o  death (in the extent to which such a right could be invested in the privacy of any 
singular person), nor even the rights of the dead (in the extent to which such a right could 
be extended to the memory of those who once lived), but the rights of death, of death as 
the operation of the limit that gives us to life. It is death that hollows out that abyss (of 
original repetition) within life, thanks to which a life can claim itself. Hence, the claimant 
can claim its first right, the right to life, only on the basis of its already having been 
claimed by death. Certainly, we must resist the temptation to allow this "mystical" dimen- 
sion of the law to occult the process by which particular, historically derived identities 
attempt to gain some purchase on social justice. However, we must be equally vigilant 
in ensuring that the strategic calculations by means of which these identities are endorsed 
not deafen us to what remains incalculable in the singular suffering of our bodies (a 
suffering which remains irreducible to any problem of material needs). It is in this double 
imperative that we may recognize the task given to us in "reading our rights." 
Andrew Payne 
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